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Independent administrative authorities and the standard of judicial review
Saskia Lavrijssen & Maartje de Visser1
Introduction
Recent developments in European competition and electronic communications law have led to
an increased focus on, and importance of, independent2 administrative authorities. The enforce-
ment of both fields of law underwent major changes in 2002–2003. In competition law, the
adoption of Regulation 1/20033 meant the abolition of the Commission’s monopoly over the
application of Article 81(3) EC and a move away from a system of prior authorization to one of
legal exception. As regards electronic communications, the entry into force of the 2003 Direc-
tives4 effected significant changes in the substantive law. The scope of the regulatory framework
was extended beyond telecommunications to cover all networks and services used to convey
‘electronic communications’, thereby including for instance broadcasting infrastructures.
Undoubtedly the most significant change concerned the core of regulation, namely the heavier
obligations imposed on undertakings possessing Significant Market Power (SMP). There, the
concept and its application were re-defined along competition law methodologies. 
On the institutional side, national competition or regulatory authorities respectively have emerged
as the main authorities in charge of the application and enforcement of the law. The competences
available to these authorities are often wide-ranging, at times encompassing elements of all three
of Montesquieu’s powers. These competences typically embody a considerable degree of
discretion to allow the balancing of the – opposing – interests of various groups of stakeholders,
such as consumers, competitors and manufacturers. This institutional set-up raises two fundamen-
tal issues. First, how should we ensure that despite their discretion the actions of the various
authorities are consistent with one another and in line with European law? Second, how should
we ensure that the independence of administrative authorities is counterbalanced by a certain
degree of accountability for their actions? The first issue is addressed by Regulation 1/2003 and
the 2003 Directives alike through the introduction of a number of administrative mechanisms to
coordinate and control national authorities. Most notable among these are the creation of the
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5 Commission Notice on cooperation within the Network of Competition Authorities, 2004/C 101/03, OJ 2004 C 101/43, and Recital 15 of
Regulation 1/2003, supra note 3.
6 Decision 2002/627/EC establishing the European Regulators Group for Electronic Communications Networks and Services, OJ 2002
L 200/38, amended by Decision 2004/641/EC, OJ 2004 L 293/30.
7 Art. 11(6) of Regulation 1/2003, supra note 3, and Art. 7(4) of the Framework Directive, supra note 4, respectively. 
8 In addition, there are a number of ‘softer’ instruments such as transparency requirements, consultation of stakeholders and benchmarking.
These instruments have commonly been endorsed, and supplemented, by the national authorities themselves. See for example the United
Kingdom’s Communications Act 2003, Section 3, Para. 3, which requires the Office for Communications to respect the good governance
principles ‘Transparency, accountability, effectiveness, proportionality and consistency’ and best regulatory practice in carrying out its tasks.
9 This is often perceived as particularly necessary in the case of administrative authorities as these are sometimes seen to straddle the distinction
between rule-application and rule-making. This has caused unease in Continental Member States who perceive such authorities as potentially
contravening the primacy of politics, denoting that all decisions are to be taken by or under the direction of elected officials. 
10 For another overview of the standard of review applied in Germany, the Netherlands, France and the UK: F. Stroink, ‘Judicial control of the
administration’s discretionary powers (le bilan executive-juge-administratif)’, in: R. Bakker, A.W. Heringa, F. Stroink (eds.), Judicial control,
comparative essays on judicial review, Anwerp-Apeldoorn 1995, pp. 81-99.
11 Of course, it is not just the Member States that have influenced the intensity of review; in addition, EC law and the ECHR – notably Arts.
6 and 13 thereof – have also exerted considerable influence as will be discussed in more detail in Section 4.
12 See for an overview of the standard of review applied in Germany, the Netherlands, France and the UK: F. Stroink, ‘Judicial control of the
administration’s discretionary powers (le bilan executive-juge-administratif)’, in: R. Bakker, A.W. Heringa, F. Stroink (eds), Judicial control,
comparative essays on judicial review, Anwerp-Apeldoorn 1995, pp. 81-99. See for an analysis of the standard of review applied in equal
treatment cases: J.H. Gerards, ‘Intensity of judicial review in equal treatment cases’, 2004 Netherlands International Law Review,
pp. 135-183. 
13 Note however the division in French law between ‘contrôle restraint’, or ‘contrôle minimum’, ‘contrôle normale’ and ‘contrôle maximum’.
14 These ‘phases’ should not be thought of as neatly separated pigeon-holes; rather, it can at times be difficult to draw the line between any two
phases. 
15 Ruling of the Court of Appeal of 7 – 10 November 1947, Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd Wednesbury Corp (1948) 1 KB 223,
233-234, CA. Under the Wednesbury test a court would only quash a decision if it was so unreasonable that no reasonable decision maker
could have adopted it. The Wednesbury test is often justified with reference to the constitutional doctrines of parliamentary sovereignty and
the separation of powers. Cf. P. Craig, ‘Grounds for judicial review: substantive control over discretion’, in: D. Feldman (ed.), English Public
Law, Oxford 2004a, pp. 831-834, and C. Hilson, ‘The Europeanization of English Administrative law: Judicial review and convergence’,
2003 European Public Law, no. 1, pp 125-145.
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European Competition Network (ECN)5 in competition law and the European Regulators Group
(ERG)6 in electronic communications as well as the competence for the Commission to censure
national draft decisions in extreme cases.7 The second issue is also partially addressed by the
administrative mechanisms as cooperation inter se and with the Commission as well, as control
by the latter obviously ensures some degree of accountability.8 This administrative accountability
is to be complemented by judicial accountability through judicial control exercised by national
courts over decisions taken by administrative authorities.9
Intensity of review: a sliding scale
The aim of the present article is to review how three Member States – the Netherlands, the United
Kingdom and France – have shaped the judicial accountability of independent administrative
authorities through an analysis of a number of interesting cases per jurisdiction.10/11 The determi-
nant that will be used in this respect is the standard, or intensity of review. In Europe, intensity
of judicial review is best thought of as a sliding scale, ranging from a very marginal, restrained
test to very intensive review, between which there is a large middle area.12 It is commonly not
attempted to have a strict division in different levels of intensity to further divide the large middle
area.13 This article will accordingly also refrain from doing so and instead adhere to the sliding
scale approach. We identify four different ‘phases’ on this sliding scale.14 First, there is the
extremely marginal test where the court will only intervene in the most outrageous of cases. The
red-hair example adduced by Lord Greene in the UK case of Wednesbury15 – in the example, the
court would intervene and quash a decision such as that by an English headmaster to fire all
teachers with red hair solely because he does not appreciate that hair colour – serves as a nice
illustration of this phase. The court thus limits its intervention to blatantly unreasonable deci-
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16 Lord Diplock in Council of Civil Service Unions and others v. Minister for the Civil Service (‘GCHQ’) [1984] 3 All ER 935 GCHQ classified
the broad grounds of judicial review under three main headings: illegality (unlawfulness); irrationality (unreasonableness): and procedural
impropriety (unfairness). See on this: Brian Jones and Katharine Thompson ‘Administrative Law in the United Kingdom’, in: R. Seerden
and F. Stroink (eds); Administrative law of the European Union, its Member States and the United States – A Comparative Analysis, Antwerp
2002, p. 239. 
17 This is akin to what English law calls judicial review. It is a proceeding which has two main features: firstly, it only challenges the legality
of the decision it criticizes: it claims that the decision does not respect one or several of the various rules to which the administration must
conform; secondly, if it succeeds, the court will quash the decision, and might order an injunction, but it could not grant compensation. See
on this: Jean-Bernard Auby, ‘Administrative law in France’, in: R. Seerden and F. Stroink (eds); Administrative law of the European Union,
its Member States and the United States – A Comparative Analysis, Antwerp 2002, p. 59 onwards. 
18 Case C-12/03 P, Tetra Laval II, Para. 83 of the Opinion, referring to Joined Cases C-204/00 P, C-205/00 P, C-211/00 P, C-213/00 P,
C-217/00 P and C-219/00 P, Aalborg Portland and Others/Commission, [2004] ECR I-0000, Para. 279.
19 Craig 2004a, supra note 15, p. 833. 
20 Conseil d’État, Ass., 28 mai 1971, Rec., p.  409. This balancing had previously already been used in matters concerning the field of police,
e.g. Conseil d’État, 19 mai 1933 Benjamin, Rec., p. 541. 
21 Art. 229 EC. 
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sions. Second, there is the marginal test, where the court will review the legality of the challenged
decision. Examples are judicial review in the United Kingdom,16 recours pour excès de pouvoir
in France17 and the legality control that may be pursued by the ECJ on the basis of Article 230
of the EC Treaty. As noted by Advocate General Tizzano in Tetra Lava v. Commission, in such
cases the court limits itself to ‘verifying whether the rules on procedure and on the statement of
reasons have been complied with, whether the facts have been accurately stated and whether
there has been any manifest error of appraisal or misuse of powers.’18 The legal test here is thus
not so much whether the decision is unreasonable – as under the extremely marginal phase – but
rather whether the decision is reasonable.19 Third, there is intense review, where the court will
fully review the merits of the case. It will assess whether all relevant facts were taken into
account and whether the assessment of these facts and the application of the law to these facts
has been done correctly. There is no longer any need for a manifest error on the part of the
decision maker to warrant court intervention; any error will suffice to have the decision annulled.
Fourth, there is extremely intense review, where the court can substitute its own decision for that
of the authority, simply because it believes its own decision would have been better or more
suitable. In this case, the court functions as a de facto second regulator. The best example is the
doctrine of le bilan couts avantages developed by the French Conseil d’Etat in Ville Nouvelle est
where the court held that it could check the ‘balance sheet’ of advantages and disadvantages
concerning a proposed expropriation of a number of houses to allow for the development of a
new city adjacent to the university campus.20 Another example is the unlimited jurisdiction of the
Community Courts as regards fines.21
In order to facilitate the drawing out of commonalities and differences in the approaches taken
by national courts in the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and France, we will classify the cases
discussed according to one of the four phases just identified. In each of these cases we will
however not explicitly refer to these phases but rather the terms used will correspond with this
broader framework. 
Structure
This article examines the state of law as regards judicial review in three EU Member States: the
Netherlands, the United Kingdom and France. As such, the first three sections concern each of
these Member States in the listed order. To appreciate the issue within its context, each section
commences with a brief introduction of the courts that have jurisdiction to review the decisions
of the national competition or regulatory authority/ies. In Section 4 we turn to the European level
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22 This in deviation from Art. 8:7 Awb [General Administrative Law Act]. There used to be a mandatory internal review procedure before the
matter could be brought before the court. This procedure no longer needs to be followed for the majority of the OPTA’s decisions. In
competition cases it is possible to bypass the internal review procedure with the consent of the NMa and all interested persons (Art. 7:1a
Awb). The NMa has indicated that in cases involving sanctioning decisions pursuant to competition law, it will in principle grant a request
to pass over the internal revision procedure. In all other cases, the internal revision procedure seems appropriate if for instance, the facts or
viewpoints of the parties are not clear; if it is still possible to resolve the dispute; if there are defects that can easily be remedied during the
internal revision phase. There will be a case-by-case assessment of whether a direct appeal is suitable, cf. Staatscourant 2 September 2004,
no. 168/19.
23 Art. 93 Mw [Dutch Competition Act]. 
24 Art. 17.1. (1) Tw [Dutch Telecommunications Act], referring to decisions taken pursuant to Chapter 6 [interoperability of services], Chapter
6A [obligations for SMP operators], Chapter 6B [Arts. 6 and 7 Framework Directive procedure], Chapter 12 [dispute settlement] or Chapter
15 [enforcement], with the exception of decisions pursuant to Art. 15.2.a [preventing an operator from offering electronic communications
services or networks] and 15.4 [fines and periodic penalty payments]. 
25 Art. 17.1(2) Tw. This provision applies in deviation of Art. 8.7. Awb. 
26 Policy discretion means that the relevant legislation does not prescribe what kind of decision the authority should take, if the legal conditions
of a power are fulfilled. H.D. van Wijk, W. Konijnenbelt and R.M. van Male, Hoofdstukken van Bestuursrecht, The Hague 2005, pp. 141-151.
27 In the case of discretion in interpretation it is up to the judgment of the administration to determine whether the legal requirements for the
exercise of powers have been met in the case at hand, Van Wijk Konijnenbelt and Van Male 2005, supra note 26, pp. 141-151, and Stroink
1995, supra note 10, p. 86. 
28 L.F.M. Verhey and N. Verheij: ‘De macht van de marktmeesters, markttoezichthouders in constitutioneel toezicht’, in: Toezicht, Handelingen
Nederlandse Juristen-Vereniging, 2005, no. 1, p. 313. See also C.A.J.M. Kortmann, Constitutioneel recht, Deventer 2005, p. 65.
29 Verhey en Verheij 2005, supra note 28, p. 313. 
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to ascertain the influence of EC law and the European Convention on Human Rights, notably
Articles 6 and 13 thereof, on the standard of review. The next section examines the impact, if
any, of the new European cooperation and harmonizing mechanisms, introduced under Regula-
tion 1/2003 and the 2003 Directives, on the intensity of judicial review. Section 6 contains some
concluding observations. 
A number of the cases mentioned in the discussion below have been decided under the 1998
telecommunications framework or before the entry into force of Regulation 1/2003. They
nevertheless provide a good illustration of the developments in judicial review. 
1. The Netherlands
1.1. Competent courts
The decisions of both the Dutch competition authority – the Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit
(NMa) – and the Dutch regulatory authority – the OPTA – are reviewed exclusively by the
specialized Rotterdam District Court.22 The District Court is part of the administrative court
structure. Appeals lie to the specialized College van Beroep voor het Bedrijfsleven (CBB).23 To
speed up legal proceedings the revised Telecommunications Act stipulates that the most impor-
tant regulatory decisions taken by the OPTA can only be appealed to the CBB – no further appeal
being possible.24 As regards decisions imposing sanctions, the normal procedure applies, i.e. the
Rotterdam District Court decides in first instance and appeal lies to the CBB.25 
According to Dutch administrative law terminology independent authorities can have compe-
tences that provide the authority with a degree of discretion in policy making (‘beleidsvrijheid’)26
and competences that provide a degree of discretion in interpretation (‘beoordelingsvrijheid’).27
Decisions taken under the former type of competence are reviewed marginally;28 decisions taken
under the latter type of competence are in principle reviewed intensively. However, if the law
allows for a wide margin of discretion in interpretation – often evidenced in the phrase ‘in the
opinion of’ – the legislator can require courts to apply marginal review.29 
Independent administrative authorities and the standard of judicial review
30 Under the old Telecommunications Act, the competences given to the OPTA were phrased in very restrictive terms, spread over a number
of limited categories of possible situations as opposed to covering all activities that might arise in the telecommunications markets that would
require regulation. The approach under the new Telecommunications Act, implementing the 2002 Directives, shows some improvement in
this respect. 
31 A.T. Ottow, ‘Het verschil tussen Duivenhokken en telecommunicatie – De bestuurs(proces)rechtelijke obstakels bij het toezicht op de
telecommunicatiemarkt’, in: B.M.J. van der Meulen and A.T. Ottow (eds.), Toezicht op Markten, VAR-reeks, 130, The Hague 2003,
pp. 212-222.
32 District Court of Rotterdam, judgment of 13 September 2000 KPN v. OPTA, Telec 99/2715-RIP, Telec 99/2781-RIP, LJN AA7093.
33 CBB, judgment of 25 April 2001 KPN v. OPTA and Dutchtone, annotation by A.T. Ottow, Mediaforum, 2001 no. 6, pp. 212-220. See also
District Court of Rotterdam, judgment of 16 February 2001,VTELEC 00/2530-SIMO – judgment after preliminary judgment in proceedings
between KPN and the OPTA, with MCI Worldcom as third party, LJN AB0027.
34 Under the current technological set-up, each number ‘belongs’ to an operator, meaning that the customer who uses that particular number
can only be reached through the network of this operator. Accordingly, each operator is placed in a dominant position vis-à-vis other
operators, since calls made to its subscribers, from wherever they may originate, must be terminated over its network, at the tariff set by the
operator in question. 
35 The Telecommunications Act 1998 implemented the old ONP directives. According to these directives operators could only be designed as
SMP operators in case they had a market share of at least 25% on a market that was defined in the Directives. Since the market of mobile
termination was not defined as a relevant market within the ONP directives, the mobile operators could not be designated as SMP operators.
36 Network operators are under the obligation to negotiate and conclude interconnection agreements which each other. 
37 According to Art. 4:84 Awb [General Administrative Law Act] an administrative body is required to act in accordance with its guidelines,
unless this would lead to unacceptable consequences in the particular case under consideration. The MTA policy guidelines were adopted
after consultation with both the Dutch competition authority and interested parties. 
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1.2. Judicial control of decisions by the OPTA
Competence issues under the Telecommunications Act 1998
The judgments regarding decisions by the OPTA taken pursuant to the Telecommunications Act
1998 (old) mainly concerned the determination of the scope of its competences under the
Telecommunications Act.30 According to Ottow, the case law indicates that the intensity of
review applied by the courts has swung from marginal to intensive and vice versa in this
respect.31 It should be noted that courts in general intensively review whether national authorities
have respected the limits of their powers, although courts may differ on how to interpret the
scope of the powers at issue. It is notable that in a number of instances, the exercise of compe-
tences by the OPTA was reviewed more thoroughly by the District Court than by the CBB. Good
examples are offered by the Dutchtone case and the MTA case. 
The Dutchtone case concerned the OPTA’s competences for dispute settlement. According to the
Telecommunications Act 1998 (old), the OPTA could only entertain a request for dispute
resolution if the undertakings concerned had made a ‘reasonable attempt’ to resolve the matter
themselves. The issue before the courts centred on how to determine whether an attempt had been
‘reasonable’. The CBB employed a marginal test where the District Court had intensely reviewed
the same decision.32 The CBB held that, as a specialist administrative authority, the OPTA should
be accorded a certain degree of discretion in deciding whether an attempt had indeed been
‘reasonable’. This was necessary, it said, because the OPTA needed discretion to allow it to
achieve the objectives of the Telecommunications Act.33 
The subsequent case of MTA (Mobile Terminating Access Tariffs) concerned the issue of whether
the OPTA could regulate mobile terminating access tariffs34 on an ex ante basis. A strict reading
of the Telecommunications Act 1998 (old) suggested that it could not,35 allowing intervention
only on an ex post basis, at the request of market parties seeking a settlement of interconnection
disputes.36 In such cases, the OPTA would have to formulate ‘reasonable’ tariffs and conditions.
The OPTA subsequently published general policy rules setting out how it would determine such
tariffs and conditions.37 On the basis of these policy rules, it set maximum tariffs with the
ultimate goal that all mobile operators would make their MTA tariffs cost-oriented by July
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38 2002 Staatscourant, no. 65, p.  22, as amended by 2002 Staatscourant, no. 142, p. 21. Although the Dutch competition authority (NMa) at
the time used the principle of cost-orientation as a determinant in assessing whether dominant firms had engaged in abusive pricing practices,
it was heavily debated whether the competition authority could impose cost-orientation as a remedy subsequent to a finding of abuse of
dominance. See on this: E.H. Pijnacker Hordijk and Y. de Vries, ‘Onbillijk hoge prijzen als vorm van misbruik van een economische
machtspositie onder het Europese en het Nederlandse mededingingsrecht’, 2002 SEW, no. 12, pp. 430-446. 
39 It should be noted that under Dutch law no appeals are possible against policy rules: Art. 8:2 Awb. However, the market parties can appeal
against (individual) final decisions based on these policy rules and ask the court to disapply the policy rules in their individual case. 
40 District Court of Rotterdam, judgment of 25 April 2003, O2 v. OPTA, TELEC 02/2156 GERR, LJN AF8131, annotation by A.T. Ottow, 2003
Mediaforum, no. 9, pp 309-312. Indeed, in accordance with the Telecommunications Act, the OPTA had granted the mobile operators an
exemption from the legal obligation to connect their networks directly. However, the OPTA had granted that exemption in response to the
first provisional ruling by the District Court of Rotterdam in the same case. In that ruling the Court had indicated that the OPTA had to grant
an exemption as a pre-condition for it to have jurisdiction over disputes concerning indirect interconnection: preliminary judgment by the
District Court of Rotterdam, judgment of 1 May 2002 Telfort v. OPTA VTELEC 02/900 RIP, LJN AE2382. It is ironic that the same Court
one year later used the exception to preclude the OPTA from settling indirect interconnection disputes. It can be argued that, in the light of
the text of Arts. 6.3 and 6.1 Tw 1998 (old) and the rationale behind the grant of competence for dispute settlement – safeguarding the
interoperability of networks – the approach taken by the District Court of Rotterdam was too restrictive. Since indirect interconnection
disputes can be as damaging for interoperability as direct interconnection disputes, there would have been good reason to support an
interpretation of the Tw that would hold that the OPTA did indeed have the competence to also settle disputes as regards indirect
interconnection. The new Telecommunications Act now confers upon the OPTA the competence to also settle indirect interconnection
disputes. 
41 Note that Art. 4 of the Framework Directive, supra note 4, – requiring national review bodies to duly take into account the merits of the case
before it – aims to counter such excessive judicial formalism. 
42 See A.T. Ottow, ‘De bewijspositie van de NMa en de rechterlijke toetsing van besluiten inzake aanmerkelijke marktmacht’, 2005
Mediaforum, no. 6, 2005, pp. 227-228, and S.A.C.M. Lavrijssen, ‘De rol van de Nederlandse administratieve rechter bij het toezicht op de
mededinging’, 2004 SEW, no. 1, pp. 34-35. 
43 Art. 1.3(4) of the Telecommunications Act now requires the OPTA to demonstrate with reference to both qualitative and quantitative
indicators that any measures which have a significant impact on the relevant market are necessary for achieving the objectives of the
Telecommunications Act as well as proportionate to achieve those objectives. In the light of the current – rather intensive – standard of
review, it is doubtful whether this Article will exert much impact. 
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2003.38 In other words, the OPTA could be said to have engaged in ex ante regulation of the
MTA tariffs. This was the viewpoint of the mobile operators and they accordingly brought
proceedings against the decisions adopted by the OPTA pursuant to these policy rules, claiming
lack of competence.39 The problem that the District Court of Rotterdam faced in this case was
that the networks of the mobile operators were not directly connected. They were merely
indirectly connected, through the fixed telephone network of KPN, the former incumbent. Using
this distinction between direct and indirect interconnection, the Court ruled that the OPTA in any
event did not have the competence to settle disputes between the mobile operators as the
Telecommunications Act only allowed for dispute settlement as regards direct interconnection
disputes.40 By using this formalistic approach, the District Court – conveniently – managed to
avoid addressing the more contentious issue of the legality of the policy rules.41 The District
Court here intensively reviewed the limits of the competence of the OPTA, which is normal
practice where competence issues are at stake. 
Review on the merits of OPTA decisions 
Since many of the OPTA’s decisions have been annulled for formal reasons – read: lack of
competence due to restrictive drafting of the Telecommunications Act 1998 (old) – the courts
have only rarely had the opportunity to engage in a review of the merits of the case at hand.
However, the few judgments that did address the merits of a case indicate that the District Court
of Rotterdam and the CBB do not shy away from a thorough review of decisions that concern
complex legal and economic assessments.42 The District Court generally applies an intense
standard of review, whereas the CBB applies a standard of review that holds between marginal
and intense, depending on the circumstances of the case. For example, in cases concerning the
designation of market parties as having Significant Market Power (SMP) both courts intensely
scrutinize the market analysis carried out by the OPTA as well as the reasoning adduced in
support of the OPTA’s findings and remedies.43 
Independent administrative authorities and the standard of judicial review
44 District Court of Rotterdam, judgment of 23 December 1999, Libertel v. OPTA, VTELEC 99/2547-SIMO, with annotation by E. Loozen
and K. Mortelmans, 2000 Mediaforum, no. 2, pp. 67-70. By virtue of Art. 6.4. of the Telecommunications Act 1998 (old) the OPTA had less
discretion in evaluating which market parties had SMP than under the new Telecommunications Act. Under the old Telecommunications
Act the OPTA could only designate an undertaking as having SMP, if this undertaking was active on a market predefined by the law and if
this undertaking had a market share of at least 25%. However, in addition to the determination of the market shares the OPTA still had to
conduct a market analysis to evaluate whether the economic conditions in a market pointed to the presence of SMP. According to the court
the OPTA had some discretion in performing the market analysis. However, if the results of the market analysis led to the conclusion that
despite the fact that an undertaking had a market share of 25% or above 25% it did not have SMP, the OPTA was under an obligation not
to designate the undertaking as SMP. Conversely, if the market analysis led to the conclusion that an undertaking with a market share below
25% had SMP, the OPTA had to designate the market operator as an SMP undertaking. 
45 CBB, judgment of 8 September 2004, AWB 04/45 and 04/49, judgment on appeals by the OPTA and KPN against the judgment of
9 December 2003 by the District Court of Rotterdam, with annotation by W. Knibbeler and P.J. Kreijger, 2005 Mediaforum, no. 1, pp. 28-35.
46 CBB, judgment of 3 December 2003, AWB 03/0406, 03/418, 03/425, judgment on appeal against the judgment of 26 February 2003 by the
District Court of Rotterdam, with annotation by GC, AB 2004/189. See also CBB, judgment of 6 April 2004, AWB 05/83, 05/85, 05/86,
05/88OPTA, KPN, Tele2 a.o., judgment on appeal against the judgment by the District Court of Rotterdam of 23 December 2004,
LJN AV8782.
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The District Court of Rotterdam ruled in a case concerning a decision by the OPTA designating
Libertel as SMP operator that the OPTA had only correctly applied its competences concerning
SMP designations contained in Article 6.4. Tw 1998 (old) if it had conducted an adequate market
analysis.44 In order for an analysis to be considered adequate, it had to identify the positions of
the relevant market operators and comment on marked developments as well as on the position
of any potential SMP-operators in the market. If this analysis led the OPTA to conclude that an
operator could not be considered to have SMP, despite the existence of relatively high market
shares, it was duty-bound not to designate such an operator as SMP operator. In the case at hand,
the market analysis did not comply with these stipulations and the District Court accordingly
annulled the resultant decision.
An example of the intensity of review applied by the CBB is the judgment partially upholding
the annulment by the District Court of Rotterdam of the decision by the OPTA designating KPN
as SMP operator on the market for rental lines.45The District Court had annulled the decision
because the OPTA had failed to perform an adequate market analysis as regards the possible
differentiation of the PVC (Permanent Virtual Circuits) market. The OPTA had moreover failed
to determine the precise geographical scope of the PVC market (national, regional, or local)
because it considered that KPN’s market share was so large that it could in any case be said to
have SMP for the whole of the national territory. The CBB considered that the OPTA was indeed
not justified in abstaining from differentiating the PVC market, since the identification of one or
more smaller markets would have impact on the market power of KPN. Further, the CBB
considered that KPN’s market share on the national PVC market was not so large as to justify
the OPTA’s refusal to precisely identify the geographic boundaries of the PVC market. 
It should finally be mentioned that case law indicates that the courts demand more by way of
justification and reasoning if the OPTA is called upon to interpret and apply ‘open norms’. In this
respect the CBB takes into account whether the OPTA has organized public consultation
procedures involving stakeholders and to what extent, if any, the OPTA has used the outcomes
of such procedures in interpreting and applying open norms.46 
1.3. Judicial control of decisions by the NMa 
Articles 81 and 82 EC (Articles 6 and 24 Competition Act 1998)
The District Court of Rotterdam and the CBB commonly engage in an intense review of deci-
sions by the NMa concerning the application of Articles 81 and 82 EC and their Dutch equiva-
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no. 2, pp. 47-54.
52 It should be noted that after the entry into force of Regulation 1/2003 the Dutch system has been brought into line with the European system,
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53 District Court of Rotterdam, 17 August 2004, 02/1087 RIP and 02/1468 RIP, LJN AR4213.
54 Case C-56/65 Société Technique Minière/Machinenbau, [1966] ECR 392, and Case C-399/93 Oude Luttikhuis e.a./Verenigde Coöperatieve
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lents, Articles 6 and 24 of the Competition Act 1998.47 In case there is no other decision possible,
the courts may substitute the NMa’s judgment with their own.48 Both courts review extremely
intensively decisions that impose fines.49 The courts have however marginally reviewed the
application of the criteria for an exemption of the cartel prohibition, since this necessarily entails
a balancing exercise for which wider discretion is deemed appropriate.50 
A recent case which confirms that the CBB is prepared to intensively review the reasoning
provided and the economic analysis conducted by the NMa is the case of Modint v. NMa51 which
concerned the cartel prohibition contained in Article 6 of the Dutch Competition Act. Modint was
a business association active in the fields of fashion, interior and textiles. It promotes reasonable
resell, supply and payment conditions in the form of general conditions for the participating
businesses. These general conditions addressed such matters as maximum payment reductions,
a compensation for buyers that had their payments done via a central system or had them
guaranteed by a purchasing combination and a turnover subsidy that had to be paid by the
suppliers to the purchasing combination as a compensation for additional measures to expand the
supplier’s turnover. Modint’s predecessors had notified the general conditions to the NMa to
obtain an exemption from the cartel prohibition.52 According to the NMa the general conditions
amounted to horizontal agreements between the Modint members and were aimed at restricting
competition within the meaning of Article 6 of the Competition Act 1998 at the market for the
supply of fashion and textiles. They accordingly could not benefit from an exemption. The
District Court sanctioned the NMa’s decision.53 On appeal the CBB ruled that the NMa had not
carried out an adequate market analysis in accordance with the case law of the Court of Justice
which required the NMa to assess the effects of an agreement within the economic context in
which it is applied.54 When carrying out a market analysis the NMa should take into consider-
ation the intent of the market parties and the way they actually operate in the market, the products
and services to which the agreement relates, the structure of the market concerned and the actual
functioning of the market. The CBB agreed with the appellants that the compensation and the
turnover subsidy related to the compensation for services that were delivered to the suppliers by
retail service organizations and which the suppliers centrally purchased from Modint. In other
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55 Prospective analyses refer to analyses that do not entail the examination of past or current events, but rather a prediction of events which are
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59 District Court of Rotterdam, Judgment of 31 May 2005, NUON v. NMa, MEDED 04/135-WILD, LJN AT6440, with annotation by
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words, they did not relate to the selling price. Although these conditions were in principle laid
down in agreements between the suppliers and the retail service organizations, Modint and the
buyers’ association negotiated about the actual level of the compensations on behalf of their
members. It moreover appeared that the level of the selling price is determined on the basis of
negotiations between individual suppliers and buyers and that the suppliers did not only compete
on the basis of the selling price, but also on the basis of factors such as quality and delivery time.
Although the purchase of retail services was related to the market for the supply of textiles and
fashion, the CBB held that it could clearly be distinguished from the latter market. The compen-
sation that was paid by the suppliers for the services of the retail organizations, could be qualified
as costs that the suppliers made for securing payment risks, for organizing a good debtor
administration and for measures to expand the turnover. On the basis of an analysis of the actual
economic context within which the agreements on the compensation and the turnover subsidies
functioned, the CBB concluded that the District Court had erred in holding that the NMa had
correctly decided that the decision had the object of preventing or restricting competition in the
market within the meaning of Article 6 of the Competition Act 1998. 
Merger decisions
Due to the complex prospective analyses55 that must be undertaken in merger cases, the standard
of review applied can differ from that applied in cases concerning the cartel prohibition and the
prohibition on abuse of a dominant position. In the Netherlands, the case law shows a divergence
of opinion in this respect between the District Court of Rotterdam and the CBB. For instance, in
Wegener/VNU the District Court intensely reviewed the contested NMa decision, justifying itself
by referring to – unspecified – case law of the ECJ and CFI.56 According to the District Court,
this case law did not require national courts to review merger decisions only marginally. On
appeal the CBB indicated that it would apply a standard of review which was more marginal, an
approach which it confirmed in the subsequent case of Essent v. NMa.57 According to the CBB,
the NMa should be seen to have a certain amount of discretion in merger cases – notably as
regards the assessment of the economic facts and circumstances at issue – which justifies a
standard of review that holds between marginal and intense. The CBB indicated that this standard
would require an examination of whether or not the NMa had sufficiently substantiated its
findings of whether a proposed merger was likely to raise competition concerns. The CBB
required that for the NMa to justify the refusal of approval, or approval subject to conditions, of
a proposed merger, it had to show that competition problems were ‘sufficiently likely’ to arise
if the merger were given the green light. 
After the Tetra Laval58 judgment of the ECJ, the District Court of Rotterdam in Nuon/Reliant has
confirmed that it applies an intense standard of review for analyzing merger decisions by the
NMa. In Nuon v. NMa59 the District Court states that Article 41 Mw implies that it should be
shown, with a high degree of certainty, that the conditions for the refusal of approval or the
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approval subject to conditions of a proposed merger have been met. In the case at hand, the
proposed merger did not lead to any problems from a structural viewpoint, given the modest
market shares of the undertakings concerned. However, the problem was that in the electricity
sector market shares can vary greatly depending on the time of day. Typically, at times when
demand for electricity is high, the so-called flexible power stations are used in last resort, because
these power stations are able to quickly supply the electricity demanded. Even if an undertaking
possesses a modest market share, they can still drive up the price for electricity by refusing to use
the capacity of flexible power stations they possess. The decision by the NMa was based to a
large extent on a quantitative analysis linked with economic principles related to game theory,
which demonstrated according to the NMa that the merger would create greater possibilities for
the merged entity to engage in such strategic anti-competitive behaviour due to wider access to
flexible electricity capacity. However, the time, nature and extent of such behaviour and the
effects of the merger on these were uncertain and difficult to demonstrate. Partly based on these
considerations, the District Court held that the NMa had failed to justify why a traditional
competition law-based analysis would be insufficient to prove the effects of the proposed merger.
In addition, the quantitative analysis used were based on the assumption that the undertakings
concerned would actually engage in strategic behaviour. The NMa had however failed to prove
that such behaviour had occurred in the past. The NMa has since appealed the judgment to the
CBB.60 
2. The United Kingdom
2.1. Competent courts, Wednesbury and appeal on the merits 
The structure for judicial review in the United Kingdom is comparable to that in the Netherlands.
The decisions by both the OFT (Office of Fair Trading) – the principal competition authority61
– and the OFCOM (Office of Communications)62 – the regulatory authority – are appealed to the
same court, namely to the Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT).63 A further appeal from decisions
of the CAT on a point of law lies to the Court of Appeal. Leave by either the CAT or the Court
of Appeal is required for such a further appeal.64 
Historically, in reviewing the legality of government decisions under judicial review, courts in
the United Kingdom have applied what is called the Wednesbury test as the standard of review.65
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General of Fair Trading [2002] CAT 1, [2002] CompAR 13.
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121
Under this test, the court will limit itself to ascertaining whether the procedural rules have been
complied with and whether the decision is lawful; it will only annul the decision on substantive
grounds if the decision is so unreasonable that no reasonable decision maker could have adopted
it. It is commonly accepted that it is extremely difficult for an applicant to succeed in demonstrat-
ing Wednesbury unreasonableness. Using the categorization proposed in the introduction to this
article, the Wednesbury test is a marginal or extremely marginal standard of review, depending
on the circumstances.66 
The entry into force of the Human Rights Act 1998, which incorporates most of the contents of
the ECHR into English law, coupled with the influence of EC law, have led to a more searching
standard of review in judicial review proceedings concerning human rights and/or Community
law rights.67 In both types of cases, courts are called upon to use the principle of proportionality
as their standard of review, which is – at least in human rights and EC law cases – interpreted to
amount to an intense standard of review.68
The traditional judicial review procedures typically do not apply to the review of decisions of the
economic regulators, such as the OFT and the OFCOM.69 Their decisions are subject to a
statutory appeal on the merits before the CAT. Under statutory appeal, the competences available
to the reviewing instance are typically more extensive than those available to courts under
judicial review and the intensity of review is also deeper. The CAT can strictly control the
determination and assessment of the facts and the application of the law and evaluate and
reconsider detailed economic, factual and legal analyses contained in the decision under appeal.
In practice its judgments contain detailed legal and economic analyses of the regulators’
decisions and are extensively reasoned.70 The CAT may confirm71 or set aside all or part of the
decision or remit the matter to the OFT or regulator. In addition, the CAT can give such direc-
tions as the OFT or regulator could have taken or make any other decision which the OFT or
regulator could have made. In the phraseology of this article, the standard of review employed
by the CAT ranges from intense – where the matter is quashed but remitted to the OFT or the
OFCOM – to extremely intense – where the CAT decides the matter itself. 
2.2. Judicial control of decisions by the OFT and the OFCOM: appeal on the merits 
The practice of the CAT confirms that the standard of review it applies is indeed intense. For
example, in Freeserve, the undertaking appealed to the CAT against the refusal by the Director
General of Telecommunications – the predecessor to the OFCOM – to withdraw or vary his
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rejection of Freeserve’s complaint to the Director.72 That complaint alleged that British Telecom
was conducting ‘an orchestrated campaign of anti-competitive behaviour, aimed at achieving
dominance by the incumbent in the market for retail ADSL services’ and was in breach of the
prohibition of abuse of a dominant position imposed by Section 18 of the Competition Act 1998.
Freeserve asked the Tribunal to set aside the Director’s decisions and remit the matter to the
Director to be reconsidered pursuant to Paragraph 3(2)(a) of Schedule 8 of the 1998 Act. In
support of that contention Freeserve submitted that the reasons given by the Director were
inadequate, and or erroneous in law, and that the Director’s investigation of Freeserve’s com-
plaint fell short of the standard required. Before deciding the appeal the CAT clarified the
standard of review it applies in reviewing different decisions, including the decision to reject a
complaint.73 It considered that:
‘It seems to us that the reference to an appeal ‘on the merits’ in paragraph 3(1) of Schedule
8 (of the Competition Act 1998: SL/MdV), means first that the Tribunal’s function is not
limited to the judicial review of administrative action applied in the civil courts of the United
Kingdom (…). Nor is the Tribunal limited to the heads of review set out in Article 230 of the
EC Treaty, which are applicable to the Court of First Instance (…).
In appeals where there has been a finding of infringement, it is clear that the Tribunal has a
full jurisdiction to find facts, make its own appraisals of economic issues, apply the law to
those facts and appraisals, and determine the amount of any penalty. (…)
The 1998 Act does not distinguish between an ‘infringement’ and a ‘non-infringement’
decision (…). To give one example, even where the Director has taken a decision of ‘non-
infringement’, it may be open to the tribunal in an appropriate case to substitute a decision of
‘infringement’, rather than remit the matter to the Director, provided that the Tribunal has all
the necessary material before it, and the rights to be heard of all parties have been fully
respected: that was the course followed by the Tribunal in IIB and ABTA v. Director General
of Fair Trading (‘the GISC case’) [2001] CAT 4, [2001] CompAR 62. (…)
It follows in our view, that whether it is an infringement or a non-infringement decision, the
tribunal has, in principle, to hear an appeal on the merits, that is to say to decide whether the
Director has made an error of fact or law, or an error of appraisal or of procedure, or whether
the matter has been sufficiently investigated (…).
However, the way in which the Tribunal exercises its jurisdiction is, in our view, likely to be
affected by the particular circumstances (…) Thus Both Aberdeen and Bettercare take the
view that were the Tribunal would risk converting itself from an appellate tribunal to a court
of first instance, the appropriate course of action may well be to remit the matter to the
Director, although of course the Tribunal retains a discretion not to do so (...).’ 
After these general remarks the CAT intensively scrutinized whether the Director had provided
adequate reasoning and had performed an adequate investigation in the case at hand. Although
the CAT rejected the appeal for most parts, it agreed with the applicant on the treatment of the
complaint regarding the alleged predatory pricing practices by BT. According to the CAT at this
point the Director’s decision lacked analytical rigour and suffered from poor reasoning. The
Director had concluded that since it had been decided under the Telecommunications Act that
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the practices of British Telecom did not amount to cross-subsidies or margin squeeze, these
practices by the same token also could not qualify as predatory pricing behaviour in violation of
the Competition Act 1998. The CAT held that this proposition should have been explained more
clearly. It also stated that the Director should have specified on which economic principles he had
relied in scrutinizing the behaviour of British Telecom. Finally, the Director had failed to make
a clear distinction between the concepts of cross subsidy and predatory pricing, and had not
justified why the test for cross subsidies also applied to allegations of predatory pricing. In the
view of the CAT, it was far from clear that the tests for abusive predatory pricing, an abusive
margin squeeze or an abusive cross subsidy were the same either under the Competition Act 1998
or in Community law. 
More recently the CAT annulled a decision by the OFCOM concerning the designation of
Hutchison 3G (UK) as a party having Significant Market Power at the wholesale market for the
termination of mobile calls, despite the fact that this decision was approved by the European
Commission in accordance with Article 7 of Directive 2002/21/EC. The CAT rejected the
appellant’s submission that as a consequence of the ECJ judgment in Tetra Laval the standard
of proof for prospective analysis had become higher, in the sense that the OFCOM had to prove
with a ‘high degree of probability’ as opposed to ‘on the balance of probabilities’ that an
undertaking should be considered to have SMP. Nevertheless, the CAT recalled that Tetra Laval
demonstrates that there is a need to be particularly thorough as regards analyses relating to future
conduct. Furthermore, the CAT agreed with the following considerations of the Irish Electronic
Communications Appeals Panel (‘ECAP’):
(…) ‘ Rather the panel is merely asserting the common sense proposition that when one is
making a finding of significant market power on the basis of a prospective market analysis (as
opposed to an ex post analysis) then it is necessary that this analysis be sufficiently rigorous
and thorough so that a clear link can be drawn between existing circumstances and likely
future behaviour. To put it in another way, because the likelihood of error is greater in a
prospective analysis, the prospective analysis must be proportionately more rigorous to
account for this possibility’.74
Subsequently the CAT intensely reviewed the legal and economic analysis conducted by the
OFCOM. It concluded that the OFCOM erred in its determination as to the existence of Signifi-
cant Market Power because it had failed to assess the extent to which British Telecom had
countervailing buyer power which could negate the finding of SMP on the part of Hutchison. 
2.3. Judicial control of decisions by the OFT and OFTEL: judicial review 
In a limited number of instances decisions of the OFT are reviewed on the basis of traditional
judicial review principles. The principal example is formed by the decisions of the OFT and
Competition Commission75 relating to the reference and approval of mergers.76 Despite the
application of traditional judicial review principles, the standard of review in scrutinizing the
substantive aspects of a case is typically not extremely marginal. In accordance with the practice
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of the Community Courts, the CAT and the common law courts have shown a willingness to
review certain aspects of merger cases more intensely.77 
The Administrative High Court considered in the Interbrew case that the Competition Commis-
sion should respect the proportionality principle on the basis of EC law and the ECHR where it
imposes remedies on market parties to deal with the perceived anti-competitive effects of
mergers that were referred to the Competition Commission by the European Commission by
virtue of Article 9 of Regulation 4064/89/EG (old).78 This was the first time that the High Court
quashed a decision by the Competition Commission on the grounds that the latter had failed to
hear the parties on possible remedies to counter the perceived anti-competitive effects that would
result from the takeover of Bass by Interbrew. Although the Court reviewed the merits of the case
marginally, both the annulment of the decision on the basis of a procedural irregularity and the
reference to the proportionality principle indicated a willingness of the court to have a more
intense look at the way the Competition Commission did its job.79 
The IBA-Health Limited case concerned a review of a decision by the OFT not to make a
reference to the CC under Section 33(1) of the Enterprise Act 2002 of an anticipated acquisition
by iSOFT Group plc of Torex. By virtue of Art. 33(1) of the Act the OFT has to make a reference
to the Competition Commission if the OFT believes that it is or may be the case that the proposed
merger may be expected to result in a substantial lessening of competition within any market or
markets in the United Kingdom for goods or for services.80 The appeal was lodged by IBA-
Health, a competitor of iSoft and Torex. IBA-Health submitted that it was self-evident that ‘it
is or may be the case’ that the proposed iSoft/Torex merger could be expected to result in a
substantial lessening of competition within the UK. Both companies were direct competitors in
the supply of software applications to hospitals and they were the two largest companies active
in the sector. In its preliminary ‘issues letter’ (comparable to the Statement of Objections by the
European Commission) the OFT indicates a number of competition concerns raised by the
proposed merger. In its final decision, the OFT stated that iSOFT and Torex had been the two
leading suppliers of IT software to the healthcare sector in the United Kingdom. However, while
such a strong legacy base could in theory give the parties the opportunity to detrimentally affect
the state of competition in the market, it was unlikely, in and of itself, to confer significant
market power in view of the changes to the Nation Programme for IT (‘NPfIT’) – a public
procurement programme for IT software. Speaking on the standard of review to be applied in
judicial review cases the CAT held that:
‘ (..) a particular feature of the specific context of section 120 (of the Enterprise Act 2002;
SL/MdV) is that Parliament has created the Tribunal as a specialised tribunal. That is in
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of the report of the Competition Commission the regulator makes its final decision which is subject to judicial review. See for more
information on the appeals procedure at the Competition Commission: P.A. Geroski, ‘Appealing to the UK Competition Commission’, 2004
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contrast to the more normal situation where a non-specialised court is called upon to review
the decision of a specialised decision maker.’81
The CAT also addressed the question of whether the OFT had any discretion in deciding whether
or not to refer a proposed merger to the Competition Commission and held that it had not.
According to the CAT, a referral is mandatory if the OFT believes that the proposed merger
would lead to a (significant) lessening of competition in the market concerned.82 Although the
OFT had some margin of appreciation in applying the legal norms of the Enterprise Act 2002,
the CAT apparently thought that this was not the kind of discretion that would justify a very
marginal standard of review. On the basis of the nature of the powers at issue the CAT justified
the standard of review applied by stating that it was not reviewing whether the decision under
appeal was Wednesbury unreasonable. It rather asked itself whether the decision by the OFT was
not erroneous in law, and was one which was reasonably open to the OFT to take, giving the
word ‘reasonably’ its ordinary and natural meaning.83 Subsequently it applied this test in the case
at hand. The CAT found that there was an alternative view to which the OFT could reasonably
have come. This alternative view was contained in the ‘issues letter’. The CAT indicated that it
had expected to find in the final decision a detailed point-by-point rebuttal of the concerns set out
in the issues letter to demonstrate that the alternative view could not reasonably be held. The
CAT was also not able to ascertain what evidence the OFT had relied upon to support its decision
and if that evidence was indeed capable of supporting that decision. The CAT therefore quashed
the decision. 
On appeal the Court of Appeal agreed with the standard of review applied by the CAT, in the
sense that the Wednesbury test was not applicable in this case. The Court of Appeal confirmed
that the decision by the OFT could not be upheld since it was not based on adequate evidence and
lacked adequate reasoning.84 
The same standard of review can also be discerned in cases concerning licence modification
procedures that were followed on the basis of the old Telecommunications Act 1984.85 As a
consequence of the broad discretion seemingly inherent in decisions modifying licences, the
courts traditionally adopted an extremely marginal standard of review.86 However, in a judgment
concerning the OFTEL’s (Office of Telecommunications: predecessor to the OFCOM) decision
to regulate the mobile terminating access tariffs of mobile operators, confirmed on appeal by the
Competition Commission,87 the Administrative High Court showed its willingness to subject the
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decisions of the regulator to a more searching judicial review.88 The case centred on the determi-
nation of the meaning of the phrase ‘all reasonable demands’ found in Article 3 of the Telecom-
munications Act 1984. Referring to previous case law,89 the judge considered that the question
whether a decision was in accordance with ‘all reasonable demands’ could be assessed against
objective criteria and that the court was therefore well-placed to answer this question. The court
however recognized that it was not an easy task to judge whether the regulator had complied with
objective criteria. A range of different criteria could be taken into account in deciding the
question of whether a decision satisfied ‘all reasonable demands’. Reasonably acting decision
makers could very well differ on the weight that should be given to each of these criteria. On the
basis of the preceding considerations the court concluded that OFTEL was justified in applying
a broad interpretation of the words ‘all reasonable demands’ and that it could take into account
the element of fairness as well. Moreover, the court was of the opinion that OFTEL and the
Competition Commission had indeed taken into account all relevant circumstances in this case.90
3. France
3.1. Competent courts 
France operates a dual enforcement structure in competition law, comprising a government
department, the DGCCRF, and an independent administrative authority, the Conseil de la
Concurrence. This has resulted in a differentiated structure as regards the types of court that
control competition decisions. Decisions taken by the DGCCRF are subject to review under the
administrative court structure by the Conseil d’Ėtat. Appeals from decisions by the Conseil de
la Concurrence are taken to the Paris Cour d’Appel, which is part of the civil court structure.91
A further appeal on points of law lies to the Cour de Cassation. 
A division of jurisdiction between the civil and administrative courts is also evident as regards
the types of court that control decisions taken by the French regulatory authority, the ARCEP.
The Paris Cour d’Appel – a civil court – deals with appeals against dispute resolution decisions
by the ARCEP.92 The judgments of the Paris Cour d’Appel are themselves subject to appeal
before the Cour de Cassation.93 The Cour de Cassation re-examines points of law and may quash
a judgment. All other decisions by the ARCEP, including those imposing sanctions, must be
appealed to the Conseil d’État.94
In terms of the standard of review, French civil courts have pleine juridiction to review decisions,
meaning that they review the entire case file de novo. The standard of review is thus typically
extremely intense. Administrative courts are competent to pronounce the annulation of a decision
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– quashing order – or the réformation – amend the decision under scrutiny.95 In French competi-
tion law, the result is a hybrid construction: a civil court has jurisdiction to review decisions of
the Conseil de la Concurrence, but it has to use the standard of review applied by administrative
courts. Using the four phases identified in the introduction to this article, we can classify the
control carried out as regards decisions by the Conseil de la Concurrence and the ARCEP as
intense, and in certain cases where the court avails itself of réformation, as extremely intense. An
analysis of the case law of the courts confirms adherence to this theoretical framework.96 
3.2. Judicial control of decisions by the Conseil de la Concurrence and the ARCEP
The clearest expression regarding the role of the court and concomitantly regarding the intensity
of review can be found in SA Bouygues97 concerning fines imposed by the Conseil de la Concur-
rence on a number of undertakings for participating in a cartel in the construction sector. There,
the Cour d’appel held that:
‘the court has the power to amend decisions [réformation], examine the facts de novo –
whereby it has the competence to re-qualify and differently appreciate the facts insofar as the
proportionality of sanctions is concerned – and it can control the reasoning of the decision of
the Conseil de la Concurrence’(own translation).
A case in which we can see an application of that approach, in particular a thorough re-examina-
tion of the facts, is SA Lyonnaise des eaux.98 The Conseil de la Concurrence had found the
existence of a cartel amongst a number of water suppliers, based on inter alia the practice of the
cartel members of participating in only a limited number of tenders per year so that members
would never be in direct competition with each other for the same contract; and the practice of
setting up ad hoc groups composed of several cartel members who would then submit a tender
offer as a group rather than individually. The Cour d’appel intensely scrutinized the facts
adduced by the Conseil to support the imposition of fines on the alleged cartel members and
came to a diametrically opposite conclusion. As regards the first element, it held that this practice
did not indicate in and of itself that the cartel members were indeed the most competitive
undertakings active in the field. The evidence indicated, or so the Cour held, that the differences
between the winning and the second best offer were typically limited, meaning that there was
competition between the undertakings active on the market as regards the great majority of
contracts. Further, also non-cartel members adopted the practice of limiting the number of tender
offers to only a few per year. The parallelism of behaviour found by the Conseil could thus be
explained by the functioning of the market, where all undertakings in fact ended up adopting the
same type of behaviour. In respect of the second element, the Cour d’appel found that the
practice of submitting offers by ad hoc groups was inspired by the wish on the part of the
individual undertakings to establish themselves on the market and to obtain greater efficiency and
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thereby attract larger contracts. There was accordingly no evidence of any anti-competitive object
inherent in the practice. The Cour thereupon annulled the contested decision.99 
In the area of electronic communications a first case of interest is SA France Télécom v. SA
Iliad.100 The case revolved around a dispute between France Télécom and Iliad concerning the
payments the latter had to make in order to obtain a list of subscribers to the fixed telephone
network of France Télécom. After negotiations failed, both parties turned to the ARCEP for a
decision to settle the matter. Dissatisfied with the ARCEP’s settlement decision, France Télecom
brought the matter before the Paris Cour d’appel. The latter annulled the contested decision,
finding an infringement of a procedural requirement, namely the principle of adversarial
proceedings.101 The Cour then went on to state that, after annulment of the contested decision,
it could dispose of the matter itself.102 In doing so, the Cour d’appel settled the dispute in a
manner that in certain respects went further than the annulled decision.103
The intense control of administrative decisions also comes to the fore in the judgment by the
Conseil d’État in the matter of Scoot-France et Fonecta.104 In France, information services by
telephone – such as retrieving someone’s phone number – were offered by the operators of
communications networks as well as by other providers. The ARCEP105 had issued a decision
according to which the first category was to make use of the number ‘12' which was the number
traditionally associated with information services by telephone. Operators did not have to pay a
fee for the use of the number ‘12'. Conversely, other providers had to make use of a four-digit
number which was the same for all providers. They were also charged for the use of this number.
The Conseil first decided that the decision infringed the principle of equality, by treating
differently undertakings that from the viewpoint of consumers offered the same service,.The
Conseil d’État secondly held that the ARCEP had misunderstood the objective of effective and
loyal competition between operators of communications networks and other providers of
information services by telephone. Since both the operators and the other providers were offering
a service that was substitutable from a consumer perspective, they were accordingly active in the
same relevant market. By determining that only network operators could use the traditional
number ‘12', the contested decision in fact endorsed the existing dominant position of network
operators in the market for information services by telephone. This, the Conseil d’État held, was
clearly in defiance of the objective of effective competition. It accordingly annulled the decision
and gave the ARCEP six months to adopt the appropriate measures. 
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4. Judicial review and ECJ case law 
4.1. National procedural autonomy
The European Treaties, as well as secondary legislation, in principle contain only substantive
rules to achieve the lofty objectives set out in Article 2 EC and the preamble of the Treaty on
European Union. They do not in principle concern themselves with the procedural framework
within which Community rules are to be enforced. Devising this framework is deemed to fall
within the realm of the constituent Member States, primarily because the EC has only very
limited competences to influence national administrative structures106 and the Member States
have very strong national traditions in this field. This division of powers between the EC
– creator of rights and obligations – and the Member States – creators of procedures and
remedies – is commonly captured in the doctrine of national procedural autonomy. As stated by
the ECJ in one of its most oft cited judgments on the topic:
‘Accordingly, in the absence of Community rules on this subject [limitation periods for legal
actions], it is for the domestic legal system of each Member State to designate the courts
having jurisdiction and to determine the procedural conditions governing actions at law
intended to ensure the protection of the rights which citizens have from the direct effect of
Community law’107
National procedural autonomy also applies to the determination of the standard of review applied
by national courts in reviewing administrative decisions. Historically, this has resulted in
diverging standards – ranging from traditional Wednesbury in the United Kingdom to substitution
in France. 
However, while the doctrine leaves a substantial degree of discretion to the Member States, there
are limitations. National procedural autonomy is subject to two conditions, also drawn up by ECJ
case law. First, the principle of effectiveness requiring that the exercise of Community rights is
not made excessively difficult or impossible. Second, the principle of equivalence requiring that
procedures governing the exercise of Community rights are not to be less favourable, i.e. by
imposing stricter requirements, than those applicable to similar claims in national law.108
Moreover, it should be noted that the Court reasoned that the doctrine of national procedural
autonomy only holds to the extent that Community law is silent on these issues. Over time case
law109 and secondary legislation110 have made ever more inroads into the applicability of the
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115 Para. 39.
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doctrine. An example of the former is the recognition by the Court in its case law that individuals
have a right to effective legal protection, partly derived from Articles 6 and 13 of the ECHR.
There is an important connection between the principle of effective legal protection and Article
234 EC in this respect.111 The principle of effective legal protection not only requires access to
an independent court, but also the possibility for the national judge to judge the merits of the case
and to refer preliminary questions to the ECJ.112 Therefore, it is submitted that the right to
effective legal protection prevents a court from exercising marginal judicial control in reviewing
national decisions in which the authority concerned applies and enforces EC law.
In EC electronic communications law, this viewpoint is communicated through the introduction
of Article 4(1) of the Framework Directive, stipulating that:
‘Member States shall ensure that effective mechanisms exist at national level under which any
user or undertaking providing electronic communications networks and/or services who is
affected by a decision of a national regulatory authority has the right of appeal against the
decision to an appeal body that is independent of the parties involved. (…) Member States
shall ensure that the merits of the case are duly taken into account and that there is an
effective appeal mechanism. (…)’
4.2. ECJ case law: marginal in form, intense in substance
According to Article 230 EC, the Community Courts are only competent to review the legality
of EC acts, or, in other words, to engage in marginal review.113 In recent judgments in competi-
tion law cases by the ECJ but especially the CFI both Courts have, while formally adhering to
this legality control, in fact engaged in intense review of the case concerned.114 In its Tetra Laval
judgment, the Court of Justice held that:
‘Whilst the Court recognises that the Commission has a margin of discretion with regard to
economic matters, that does not mean that the Community Courts must refrain from reviewing
the Commission’s interpretation of information of an economic nature. Not only must the
Community Courts, inter alia, establish whether the evidence relied on is factually accurate,
reliable and consistent, but also whether the evidence contains all the information which must
be taken into account in order to assess a complex situation and whether it is capable of
substantiating the conclusions drawn from it.’115
Using this test, the ECJ condoned the CFI’s annulment of the Commission prohibition of the
merger between Tetra Laval and Sidel. It underlined that the CFI could look closely at the
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Commission’s assessment of information of an economic nature. As noted by Bay and Calzado,
this is particularly relevant in the light of the increasing use of sophisticated economic theories
in competition law.116 The only limit to the intensity of review carried out at EC level is that the
Community Courts cannot substitute their own economic assessment for that of the Commission.
It should finally be noted that the ECJ held that the need for effective judicial review is all the
more pressing where prospective analyses, such as in merger cases, are concerned. It is submitted
that this should be taken to mean that there is always a need for effective judicial review of
competition law-based analyses. The effects of the judgment thus extend beyond review of
decisions relating to conglomerate mergers, the type of merger at issue in the case.117 
In the latest judgment on the issue so far, on the banned merger between the American undertak-
ings General Electrics (GE) and Honeywell, the CFI considered that:
‘It must be observed first that the Community has a margin of assessment with regard to
economic matters (…). It follows that the Community judicature’s power of review is
restricted to verifying that the facts relied on are accurate and that there has been no manifest
error of assessment. (…) As to the nature of the Community judicature’s power of review, it
is necessary to draw attention to the essential difference between factual matters and findings,
on the one hand, which may be found to be inaccurate by the Court in the light of the argu-
ments and evidence before it, and, on the other hand, appraisals of an economic nature.’118
The CFI thus spoke of having to apply a marginal standard of review to a Commission decision.
However, if one takes a closer look at the CFI’s judgment, it turns out that the verification of the
factual findings and the assessment of the facts are interwoven and that the CFI closely scruti-
nized the economic and legal assessment of the Commission, up to the point of deciding which
economic experts it believed to be more convincing.119 To link back to the heading of this section,
the CFI framed the entire discussion in terms of finding ‘manifest errors’ committed by the
Commission, denoting marginal review. Yet at the same time it closely scrutinized the Commis-
sion’s analysis and evidence for any error, not just those of a manifest nature, which were then
accumulated and re-phrased as ‘manifest errors’, which in practice would seem to amount to
intense review. 
This brings us to the relevant question for present purposes: how does all this affect national
courts? Put simply, prospective analyses are not only carried out by the Commission under
merger control, but also by national competition authorities when they assess mergers and by
national regulatory authorities under the Significant Market Power (SMP) procedure outlined in
the Framework Directive. Accordingly, it would seem that when called upon to review national
decisions involving such analyses, national courts cannot merely apply marginal review either.120
If national courts would not heed the case law of the Community Courts121 where relevant, this
could ultimately be interpreted as an infringement of the loyalty obligation contained in Article
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10 EC and of the principle of effectiveness. Community law however does not require Member
States to establish procedures for judicial control that would result in a more extensive and
intensive review than that carried out by the Community Courts in similar cases.122 Moreover,
there are limits to how intensely prospective analyses ought to be controlled. In Tetra Laval the
ECJ also recognized that the Commission must remain able to discharge its functions and
responsibilities in an effective manner.123 A similar balancing exercise – between the need for
judicial accountability on the one hand and the need for discretion and effective law enforcement
on the other hand – needs to be undertaken by national courts, on a case-by-case basis. 
4.3. The European Convention on Human Rights
The intensity of control applied by national court is not only influenced by developments within
EC law. The European Convention on Human Rights, and notably Articles 6 and 13 thereof, have
also exerted influence. These Articles require that as regards the determination of civil rights and
obligations, or the determination of any criminal charge, everyone is entitled to an effective
remedy before an independent and impartial tribunal. The European Court of Human Rights has
further added that the competent court or tribunal should have full jurisdiction to review the facts
and the application of the law.124 Turning to the relevance of the ECHR for present purposes, the
notion ‘civil rights and obligations’ has been interpreted widely by the Court to cover the great
majority, if not all, of decisions taken by administrative authorities.125 Furthermore, sanctions
imposed by administrative authorities can, under certain conditions, qualify as a ‘criminal charge’
within the meaning of Article 6. National courts are called upon to control intensively whether
there is a proportional relationship between the offence committed and the sanction imposed. 
5. Judicial review and European harmonization and coordinating bodies
One of the effects of Regulation 1/2003 and the 2002 Directives is that European law will exert
an ever greater influence on national proceedings, both in a procedural and in a substantive way.
The relationship between the Commission and national competition authorities or regulatory
authorities respectively has been strengthened. The Commission guides the actions of the
authorities in question through the publication of soft law instruments, such as guidelines,
recommendations and letters. In addition, the mandatory communication of proposed national
actions to the Commission provides the latter with the opportunity to comment on these and
where necessary, censure them.126 
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Although these guidelines, recommendations and comments are not formally binding, a national
court cannot ignore them either.127 It can be deduced from European case law on Article 10 EC
that a national court must ‘take into consideration’ such guiding instruments from the Commis-
sion in deciding the case before it.128 Furthermore, the courts should take into account that
Regulation 1/2003 and the Framework Directive specify how the Commission and the national
authorities should co-operate and how the latter should take into account directions by the
former.129 However, due to their non-binding status130 the legal effects of these guiding instru-
ments do not go so far that the national court should directly apply soft law instruments or that
it should apply the doctrine of consistent interpretation to these instruments.131 Moreover, it
should be remembered that courts are not in a subordinate position vis-à-vis the Commission.
National courts have an autonomous position in interpreting and applying European law. If
necessary for the clarification of EC law or for a judgment on the validity of a Commission
decision, the courts should not hesitate to refer preliminary questions to the ECJ pursuant to
Article 234 EC. 
The increased influence of the Commission on the decision-making practice of national authori-
ties is likely, by the same token, to also affect the intensity of judicial review applied by national
courts when they are called upon to review decisions taken by the national competition or
regulatory authority respectively. If, for instance, the Commission has approved a draft national
measure which is subsequently adopted in the same form by the national authority, a challenge
to the national measure before the national courts is less likely to succeed. The national authority
can use the Commission’s approval to establish that the decision under appeal meets the condi-
tions set out in Articles 81 and 82 EC or in national telecommunications laws respectively.132 If
the court before which the action is brought is moreover a non-specialist body, the chances of a
successful appeal are diminished even further. In light of the considerable expertise residing
within the Commission, contrasted with the more basic knowledge of the national court, the latter
will be more likely to accord respect to the actions and opinions of the Commission, even if
formally non-binding. 
A further factor likely to influence the impact accorded to Commission statements is their detail,
or the absence thereof. A specific and detailed statement that is focused on the individual
circumstances of the case at hand, which has been adopted following a thorough investigation,
will be considered more influential than a very general statement, supported by scant reasoning.
This approach was followed by the CAT in Hutchinson 3G UK Ltd v. OFCOM.133 In its judgment
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the CAT quashed a decision by the OFCOM on the grounds of a defective investigation and poor
reasoning, despite the fact that the Commission had approved the selfsame decision. 
In sum, it can be expected that well-reasoned Commission decisions or statements can result in
a more marginal review of national decisions that have been the subject of such Commission
decisions or statements. Conversely, where a national decision deviates from Commission
guidelines or recommendations or has received negative comments from the Commission, the
national court is likely – and rightly so – to fully review that national decision. 
Concluding observations
Three welcome developments can be noted. Across the three Member States discussed in this
article, the structure within which decisions by national authorities are reviewed is largely
similar. 
With the exception of France, review is concentrated exclusively within administrative courts.
The competent courts are often specialized and in most cases review the decisions of both the
national competition and regulatory authorities. This helps to promote expertise, knowledge and
a consistent application of competition law and regulation concepts, which in turn engenders
courts confident in applying intense review of the decisions challenged before them, wherever
the nature of the decision and the competences of the authority merit thorough control. It is to be
hoped that these elements – expertise, combined jurisdiction for national competition and
regulatory authorities – are used as benchmarks by the Commission to assess the structure and
performance of other Member States against. 
Second, there is convergence in the standard of review across Member States, and at Member
State and Community level. In the majority of cases, national courts in the Netherlands, the
United Kingdom and France use an intense standard of review when reviewing the national
competition authorities’ decisions concerning the application of the European and/or national
competition rules or when reviewing decisions applying the national telecommunications
legislation by regulatory telecommunications authorities.134 Admittedly, courts may not always
explicitly indicate that this is indeed the intensity that they are applying, but what is key is not
the legal standard formally used, but the way in which it is applied. The trend of intense judicial
review in the Member States can be explained by the influences of EC law, and especially the
right to effective legal protection, and the influence of Articles 6 and 13 ECHR. 
A similar intense approach can be seen at Community level as the thorough scrutiny of Commis-
sion assessments and evidence in the judgments in Tetra Laval and GE/Honeywell show. This
convergence can result in cross-fertilization between the Member State and the Community level
in this respect.135 Trends in judicial control at national level can be used by the Community
Courts as inspiration in further developing the standard of review to be used when reviewing
Commission decisions in the area of competition law. In turn, the case law of the Community
Courts can be, and is, cited in national courts as support for more intense judicial review of
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decisions by national administrative authorities. Again, the best example to date is the Tetra
Laval judgment to which courts in the United Kingdom have explicitly referred – and the ones
in the Netherlands sub silentio. This potential mutual reinforcement helps to create some form
of soft harmonization across Europe, thereby addressing at least in part the consistency concerns
regarding the practices of the national authorities and the standard of review voiced before and
immediately after the introduction of Regulation 1/2003 and the 2003 Directives. These develop-
ments should be positively evaluated and encouraged. 
Thirdly, the trend of more stringent review of administrative decisions taken by independent
authorities can be assessed positively from a Rule of Law perspective. Stringent review amounts
to an effective control of the decisions taken by such authorities and ensures that they will
exercise their regulatory powers in a good way. Judicial control can compensate for the dimin-
ished political control of independent administrative authorities and prevents the authorities in
question from becoming uncontrolled state bodies. However, at the same time, judicial review
cannot become too intensive, with the undesirable outcome that a national authority is deprived
of discretion and flexibility in decision-making, two features that are of particular importance in
areas as dynamic as competition law and electronic communications law. 
